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Security

Study Manager manages accounts, documents and notes. These recommendations keep the risk small.

Basics​

  • Only HTTPS to the outside; redirect HTTP requests to HTTPS at the proxy.
  • Do not expose port 8080 to the internet. BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 (default) only allows the server itself; if your proxy runs elsewhere, limit access to it with a firewall.
  • Install updates: of Study Manager (Operations) and of the operating system. Automatic security updates (unattended-upgrades on Debian/Ubuntu) make sense.
  • SSH with keys only, ideally only from your network or through a VPN.
  • Protect the .env (chmod 600), never put it in a repository, and keep BACKUP_PASSPHRASE separately.

Sign-in​

  • There is no open registration; accounts are only created through invitations.
  • Admins need a passkey or an authenticator app (second factor).
  • The app limits requests per visitor (rate limits) and blocks requests to internal addresses when users enter calendar links (protection against server-side request forgery).

Verifying the images​

Every release image is signed with cosign when it is published and gets a provenance attestation from GitHub. That way you can check that an image really comes from this project's release workflow and that nobody swapped it afterwards:

cosign verify docker.io/erik1g/study-manager-server:0.1.0 \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/erik1g/study-manager/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@.*' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

The same applies to study-manager-web. Replace 0.1.0 with your version.

You check the operator package with the checksum and GitHub's provenance attestation:

sha256sum -c study-manager.sha256 --ignore-missing
gh attestation verify study-manager.tar.gz --repo erik1g/study-manager

The development builds (edge, sha-…) are not signed; use fixed versions in production.

Containers​

  • The server container does not run as root (user node); web is the unchanged Caddy image.
  • If you want to separate the network cleanly, you can restrict the containers so that they reach the internet (search model, calendar feeds) but not your home network. That is optional and depends on your firewall (e.g. rules in the DOCKER-USER chain of iptables).
  • The database studio only exists in development (infra/compose/dev.yml); do not run it publicly.

If something happens​

If you suspect a break-in: stop the containers, renew JWT_SECRET/JWT_KEYS/APP_SECRET and passwords, ask users to sign in again. You report a vulnerability in the project privately, see SECURITY.md.